School Choice, School Quality and Postsecondary Attainment by David J. Deming et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SCHOOL CHOICE, SCHOOL QUALITY AND POSTSECONDARY ATTAINMENT
David J. Deming
Justine S. Hastings
Thomas J. Kane
Douglas O. Staiger
Working Paper 17438
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17438
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
September 2011
This project was funded through grant number R305E50052 from the U.S. Department of Education,
Institute of Education Sciences. We would like to thank Lawrence Katz, Susan Dynarski, Brian Jacob
and Christopher Jencks for reading early drafts of this paper and for providing essential guidance and
feedback. We benefited from the helpful comments of Josh Angrist, Amitabh Chandra, Caroline Hoxby,
Brian Kovak, Bridget Long, Erzo Luttmer, Dick Murnane, Seth Richards-Shubik, Lowell Taylor and
seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute, Harvard University, Columbia University, the
University of Michigan, RAND and the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM)
and Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness (SREE) meetings. Special thanks to Andrew
Baxter at CMS and Sarah Cohodes and Eric Taylor at CEPR for help with matching the student files
to the NSC. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by David J. Deming, Justine S. Hastings, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger. All rights
reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission
provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.School Choice, School Quality and Postsecondary Attainment
David J. Deming, Justine S. Hastings, Thomas J. Kane, and Douglas O. Staiger
NBER Working Paper No. 17438
September 2011
JEL No. H4,I2,I21
ABSTRACT
We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (CMS) on postsecondary
attainment. We match CMS administrative records to the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), a
nationwide database of college enrollment. Among applicants with low-quality neighborhood schools,
lottery winners are more likely than lottery losers to graduate from high school, attend a four-year
college, and earn a bachelor’s degree. They are twice as likely to earn a degree from an elite university.
The results suggest that school choice can improve students’ longer-term life chances when they gain
access to schools that are better on observed dimensions of quality.
David J. Deming
Harvard Graduate School of Education
Gutman 411
Appian Way
Cambridge MA 02138
david_deming@gse.harvard.edu
Justine S. Hastings
Brown University
Department of Economics
64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
and NBER
justine_hastings@brown.edu
Thomas J. Kane
Harvard Graduate School of Education
Center for Education Policy Research
50 Church St., 4th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
kaneto@gse.harvard.edu
Douglas O. Staiger
Dartmouth College
Department of Economics
HB6106, 301 Rockefeller Hall
Hanover, NH 03755-3514
and NBER
douglas.staiger@dartmouth.edu2 
 
Today’s urban schools face increasing pressure to matriculate students who are ready 
for college. Growing returns to post-secondary education and shrinking middle-wage 
employment make college degree completion necessary for upward mobility into the 
American middle class (Goldin and Katz 2007; Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008). While 
the racial achievement gap in math and reading for elementary and middle school 
students has steadily decreased since 1990, there has been no such decline in the 
achievement gap for 17-year-old students.
1 Overall, the U.S. high school graduation rate 
is actually lower than its peak in the late 1960s, and while college enrollment rates have 
increased, degree completion has not kept pace. Importantly, racial gaps in educational 
attainment remain large. Over 40 percent of African American and Latino students in the 
United States attend high schools that graduate less than 60 percent of incoming 9
th 
graders (Balfanz and Legters 2004). Thus improving the quality of education in these 
high school “dropout factories” (Balfanz and Legters 2004) is a first-order issue for 
economic growth, national competitiveness (U.S. Department of Education 2006; 
Roderick, Nagaoka and Coca 2009), and equality of economic opportunity in light of the 
increasing wage returns to higher education (Turner 2004; Dynarski 2008; Heckman and 
LaFontaine 2010; Acemoglu and Autor 2010). 
 Yet, with a few exceptions, progress in urban high schools has been disappointing 
compared to elementary and middle schools (Murnane 2008). A series of recent studies 
of school choice policies such as intra-district open enrollment, charter schools and 
vouchers for private school tuition have found impacts on test scores for disadvantaged 
students from urban areas that range from modest to large (Rouse 1998; Howell and 
Peterson 2002; Krueger and Zhu 2004; Hoxby and Rockoff 2004; Cullen and Jacob 2009; 
Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Wolf et al. 2008 
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Angrist et al. 2011; Hastings, 
Neilson and Zimmerman 2011). These studies, while promising, focus almost entirely on 
elementary and middle school students, and as a result they are largely limited to test 
score gains as outcome measures. 
In this paper we study the impact of winning a lottery to attend a public high school in 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) on college matriculation and degree completion. 
                                                            
1 Authors’ calculations using the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Long-Term Trend data. 3 
 
CMS implemented an open enrollment public school choice program in the Fall of 2002. 
Students were guaranteed admission to their neighborhood school but were allowed to 
choose and rank up to three other schools in the district, including magnet schools. When 
demand for school slots exceeded supply, allocation was determined by lottery. Unlike 
many other studies, school choice in CMS was broad-based. Nearly half of all rising 9
th 
graders listed a non-guaranteed school as their first choice. Furthermore, lottery 
applicants came disproportionately from the inner-city neighborhoods of Charlotte, and 
there is no evidence of “cream skimming” of the best students from these neighborhoods 
into the applicant pool, resulting in a sample of applicants with similar observable 
characteristics to those typical for large urban school districts. 
We match student-level administrative data from CMS to the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a national database of postsecondary enrollment. The match is 
done directly using personal identifying information, so dropouts and transfers can be 
followed and attrition from the sample is limited only by the coverage of the NSC.
2 
Rising 9
th graders in the Fall of 2002, the first year of new school choice assignments, 
could have completed up to five years of post-secondary enrollment, enabling us to 
measure both matriculation and degree completion over a reasonable horizon.  
Our central finding is that students from low-quality neighborhood schools benefit 
greatly from choice. Lottery winners are more likely to graduate from high school, attend 
a four-year college and earn a bachelor’s degree. They are about twice as likely to earn a 
degree from an elite institution such as UNC-Chapel Hill or Duke. For these students, the 
impact of winning the lottery is large; closing nearly 75 percent of the black-white gap in 
high school graduation and 25 percent of the gap in bachelor’s degree completion. We 
also estimate the impact of winning a school choice lottery on high school test scores, 
graduation, and other school outcomes. We find no impact on 9
th grade test scores, but 
relatively large improvements in other school outcomes such as grade point average, 
math course-taking, and absences.  
We measure school quality and performance using a value-added approach.  We 
estimate a variety of school value-added measures and in our preferred specification, we 
                                                            
2 The NSC covers over 90 percent of 4-year college enrollment nationwide and in North Carolina. CMS sent every student who had 
ever been enrolled in any grade to the NSC for matching. 4 
 
cannot reject the hypothesis that school quality estimates equal the lottery-based 
treatment effects for the main educational attainment outcomes in the paper. Thus in 
addition to providing the first evidence of the impact of school choice on the college 
achievement gap, our results suggest an additional validation of the value-added approach 
using lottery-based evidence in a broad and highly-subscribed school choice program 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Kane and Staiger 2008).
 3  
Our results show that access to a higher-quality school can improve students’ longer-
term educational attainment. Importantly, the pattern of results is consistent with real and 
persistent skill gains among lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood schools. For 
example, we find large improvements in math-course completion and grades for lottery 
winners, consistent with real gains in college preparedness rather than better application 
assistance among students moving from low- to high-performing high schools. Increased 
college matriculation and degree completion also point to increased preparedness rather 
than simply decreased costs of applying as the primary channel through which higher-
performing schools benefit the long-term outcomes for their students. Taken together, the 
results suggest that attending a better high school increases long-run educational 
attainment primarily through improved preparation for college-level coursework.  
I. Background and Data Description 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the 20
th largest school district in the nation. The school 
district encompasses all of Mecklenburg County, which includes both the inner city areas 
of Charlotte and the more affluent suburbs surrounding it. Thus neighborhoods in CMS 
vary widely by race and income. In 1971, the Supreme Court (in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education) ruled that this variation resulted in neighborhood 
schools that were de facto segregated, and for over 30 years CMS schools were 
desegregated under a court order that bused students all over the district to preserve racial 
balance in the schools. Particularly at the high school level, this meant in practice that 
                                                            
3 Evidence of the benefits of high school choice on academic outcomes is scant. Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2011) 
use lottery assignments and find some evidence of choice on crime and misbehavior. Booker et al. (2011) and Lavy (2010) uses 
difference-in-difference, instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the impact of public school choice 
on high school graduation. We are aware of no study that examines the impact of choice on postsecondary attainment using a lottery-
based design. 5 
 
inner-city and largely African American neighborhoods were divided up and bused out to 
more affluent and white suburbs or to “midpoint schools” in different parts of the county. 
After several years of legal challenges, the historic court order was overturned and the 
busing plan was terminated. In December of 2001 the CMS School Board voted to move 
forward with district-wide open enrollment for the 2002-2003 school year. Because CMS 
was no longer allowed to use race explicitly in student assignments, the school 
boundaries were redrawn as contiguous neighborhood school zones. Children who lived 
within each zone received guaranteed access to their neighborhood school, which was 
usually (but not always) the closest to their home address. This resulted in a change in 
assigned neighborhood high school for about 35 percent of households.  
The school choice lottery took place in the spring of 2002. To maximize the number of 
parents that exercised choice, CMS conducted an extensive information campaign. They 
held a well-advertised fair at the Charlotte convention center, set up “choice booths” in 
local shopping malls, and sent volunteers door-to-door in low-income and non-English 
speaking neighborhoods to talk to families about the plan (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 
2008). CMS also developed a comprehensive booklet with information about each 
school, as well as smaller brochures for individual schools. As a result, over 95 percent of 
parents submitted a choice application in the spring of 2002. 
Parents were allowed to submit up to three choices, which included schools as well as 
special programs within schools.
4 Students were assigned to their neighborhood school 
by default, and admission for all other students was subject to grade-specific capacity 
limits that were set by the district beforehand but were not known to families at the time 
of the lottery (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008).
5  Children with siblings already in 
enrolled in a school also received guaranteed access. CMS was also divided into four 
“choice zones” and free transportation was provided by the district only within each zone, 
although families could provide their own transportation to any school.
6 The  district 
                                                            
4 Parents who listed three non-guaranteed choices were automatically assigned their “home school” as a 4
th choice. 
5 Indeed, the fact that the home school was guaranteed even if one did not submit an application was not clear. The district 
communicated to parents that if they did not submit a choice form, it was unclear which school their child would be assigned to. Thus 
parents who wanted their child’s home school submitted a choice form with the home school listed as their first choice. 
6 The choice zones were constructed so that there was at least one predominately white suburban and at least one predominantly black 
inner-city school in each zone. 6 
 
expanded capacity at schools where they anticipated high demand in an attempt to give 
everyone their first choice. Still, many high schools were oversubscribed.  
When demand for slots among non-guaranteed applicants exceeded supply, admission 
was allocated by random lotteries that occurred within the following lexicographic 
priority groups:  
 
(i)  Students that attended the school in the previous year and their siblings. 
(ii)  Free- or reduced-price-lunch-eligible (i.e. low-income, “FRPL”) students 
applying to schools where less than half of the previous year’s school 
population was FRPL. 
(iii)  Students applying to a school within their own choice zone. 
Applicants were sorted by priority group according to these rules, and then assigned a 
random lottery number. Slots at each school were first filled by students with guaranteed 
access, and then remaining slots were allocated within each priority group according to 
students’ lottery numbers. If all members of a priority group could be offered admission, 
slots were allocated to the next priority group in the order of lottery numbers. CMS 
administered the lottery centrally and applied an algorithm known as a “first choice 
maximizer” (Abdulkadiroğlu and Somnez 2003). This meant that CMS first allocated 
slots to all those who listed a school as their first choice and only then moved to second 
choices. As the name indicates, this maximized the percentage of students who received 
their first choice, but it also meant that students who lost the lottery to attend their first 
choice school often found that their second choice had already been filled up in the 
previous round. While there is the potential for strategic choice with this type of lottery 
mechanism, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2008) show that this is not likely to have been a 
large problem in CMS, at least in the first year of the choice plan. 
We match these files to information on college attendance from the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a non-profit organization that maintains enrollment information for 
over 90 percent of colleges nationwide. In collaboration with CMS, we provided each 
student’s full name, date of birth and (when applicable) high school graduation date, 7 
 
which the NSC used to match to its database. Rather than restricting to CMS graduates, 
we matched all students who were old enough to have been enrolled in college, 
regardless of the last grade they been enrolled in CMS. The NSC data contain 
information on enrollment spells and degrees for all covered colleges that a student 
attended. Information is available on full or part-time status and degree receipt in some 
cases. Unfortunately, we have no information about college experiences such as grades or 
choice of major. Although not all colleges provide information to the NSC, the coverage 
is very good in North Carolina and the surrounding states. The Data Appendix contains a 
list of colleges by coverage and a detailed analysis of the match process using data from 
the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data Source (IPEDS) as a 
reference.
7 Students who leave CMS are followed in these data. Attrition is subject only 
to the NSC’s coverage and the quality of the match. Unless coverage is differential for 
lottery winners and losers, the results may be attenuated but will not be biased.  
We match the lottery applicant file, with individual lottery numbers and priority 
groupings, to a panel of administrative data from CMS. Our data span the years 2000 to 
2009 and contain detailed information on students’ enrollment histories, test scores, 
course-taking and other outcomes of interest. The North Carolina Department of Public 
Instruction requires all school districts to assemble and send them a standardized set of 
files under the state’s accountability regime. In addition to enrollment records, this 
includes students’ scores on standardized End-of-Grade (EOG) exams in math and 
reading for grades 3-8 and End-of-Course (EOC) exam scores in high school subjects 
such as Algebra I and II, Geometry, English I, Biology and Chemistry. These tests are 
administered to all public school enrollees and schools are required to use the scores as 
some component of students’ grades. Importantly, these reporting requirements help to 
ensure that CMS’s records are of high quality, with longitudinally linked and consistent 
student records. 
  
                                                            
7 The major two-year college in Charlotte, Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC), did not provide information to the NSC 
until 2006. To fill in this gap, we obtained enrollment data directly from CPCC for all years. This data was more detailed than what 
colleges typically provide to the NSC. The data from CPCC contain information on type of enrollment (i.e. degree-seeking or 
correspondence course), credit accumulation and GPA. We also used the CPCC data to verify the NSC’s match process. See the Data 
Appendix for details. 8 
 
II. Sample Characteristics and School Quality Measures 
CMS received high school lottery applications from 29,584 high school students. We 
first limit the sample to students who were enrolled in any CMS school in the previous 
year. About six percent of applicants come from outside the district, and these students 
are much less likely to be enrolled in CMS the following fall. Since previous enrollment 
status is fixed at the time of the lottery, this sample restriction does not affect the validity 
of the randomization. We also exclude from the sample the small number of students who 
apply to special education programs. Finally, about five percent of this remaining sample 
does not show up in any CMS school in the fall of 2002. Although these students can still 
be matched to the NSC data and are included in those analyses, we have no other 
outcome information for them.  This restriction results in a sample of 25,564 rising 9
th-
12
th graders, or 86 percent of the original sample. Finally, we exclude rising 12
th graders 
from the analysis sample because of concerns about correct randomization.
8 This leaves 
an analysis sample of 20,021 students. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 14 neighborhood school zones in CMS. 
School zones vary widely in income, demographic composition, average student test 
scores and postsecondary attainment. Median household income ranges from $94,799 (in 
2000 dollars) in Providence to $27,278 in West Charlotte.
9  Similarly, the share of 
nonwhite students and those receiving lunch-subsidies (an indicator of poverty) ranges 
from less than 10 percent to over 90 percent.  Average 9
th grade test scores in math and 
English have a range of around 1.5 standard deviations. Most strikingly, the share of 
students attending a college that is judged as “very competitive” or better by the 2009 
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges ranges from nearly 50 percent in the highest 
income neighborhood to 2 percent in the poorest neighborhood.
10  
                                                            
8 We have analyzed the individual choice lotteries to confirm that random numbers determine offers of admission, and have found 
that they hold perfectly except for in the 12
th grade. In reviewing the historical documentation and in conversation with CMS, we have 
some concern that additional slots may have been made available at schools for rising 12
th grade applicants. Thus we exclude from the 
analysis the 85 rising 12
th grade applicants who were in marginal priority groups (about 4 percent of the lottery sample). 
9 We assign each student the median household income in their 2000 census tract and calculate the school measures as the average of 
each student’s median tract household income. 
10 School in North Carolina with a rating of “very competitive” or higher include Appalachian State University, Duke University, 
Elon University, North Carolina State University, UNC-Asheville, UNC-Chapel Hill, UNC-Wilmington, and Wake Forest University. 
Four year colleges in North Carolina that are less than “very competitive” include East Carolina University, Fayetteville State 
University, North Carolina A&T University, North Carolina Central University, UNC-Charlotte, UNC-Greensboro, UNC-Pembroke, 
Western Carolina University and Winston-Salem State University. “Most competitive” schools in North Carolina are Davidson, Duke, 
UNC-Chapel Hill and Wake Forest. 9 
 
The last three rows show the same measures for students who attend one of the three 
magnet high schools in CMS. Since these schools have no neighborhood zones, they are 
attended by students from one of the other 14 school zones in CMS. Magnet high schools 
serve predominately nonwhite students in the lower end of the income distribution. This 
is due in part to their location in the central city, whereas many of the higher-income 
schools are located in the surrounding suburbs. Magnet schools rank around the district 
average on measures such as average test scores, high school graduation and college 
attendance.  
Despite having higher average test scores and higher rates of college attendance, 
schools in higher-income neighborhoods are not necessarily better. Families that choose 
to live in these neighborhoods are likely to make other investments in their children that 
improve academic outcomes. Thus a simple comparison of mean outcomes across 
neighborhood school zones will overstate differences in school quality. We estimate each 
school’s contribution to student outcomes using a general value-added framework:  
(1)                     ,     where                 . 
 
The     vector includes basic demographic controls and third-order polynomials in state-
standardized 8
th grade math and reading EOG exams.
11 The  residual      is a linear 
combination of a school effect    (which is constant for all students in the school by 
assumption) and an idiosyncratic student-level error term (    . Under the strong 
assumption that there is no sorting on the unobserved determinants of      after 
conditioning on    , the parameter    is a causal estimate of a school’s mean impact on 
the academic achievement of its students (Raudenbush and Willms 1995, Kane and 
Staiger 2008, Rothstein 2010).  
We estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS) and take the mean residual 
across students as our estimate of   .
12  We estimate equation (1) separately for two 
                                                            
11 The demographic covariates are median household income in Census tract, and indicators for race (African American, Asian, 
Latino, white), gender, free or reduced price lunch, special education and limited English proficiency. All covariates are collected in 
the 8
th grade year. 
12 In principle, a more efficient alternative to OLS would be to use a hierarchical linear model (HLM) that accounts for the nested 
random effects implicit in our error structure (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Because of the large number of students in each school, 
HLM and OLS yield virtually identical estimates.   10 
 
cohorts of first-time 9
th graders in Fall 2002 and 2003,
13 and we take the average of the 
two estimates as our measure of school quality.
 14 We attribute each student only to the 
first high school that they attended, and we exclude students from grades 10-12 from the 
estimates to prevent bias from differential rates of grade attainment and dropout. Finally, 
we exclude the approximately 1,800 students who are in our lottery sample to avoid any 
mechanical correlation between     and the lottery treatment effects. 
Our estimates of school quality (value-added) for the five main outcomes of the paper 
are in columns 2 through 6 of Table 2. The test score measures are state standardized 
performance on End-of-Course (EOC) Math and English exams. While these exams are 
required for graduation, not all students take them at the same time. Among rising 9
th 
graders in the Fall of 2002, 50 percent took the Algebra I exam, 33 percent took 
Geometry, 7 percent took Algebra II, and 10 percent did not take an exam (either because 
they were enrolled in some other course, or because they were no longer in CMS) in the 
Spring of 2003. To construct the 9
th grade Math score variable, we assign each student 
the (standardized) score for the exam they took and we include fixed effects for the prior 
year’s exam (i.e. the student’s math “track”) in our models. Since about 92 percent of 9
th 
graders took the English exam, tracking is not an issue for that outcome. We also 
estimate school value-added for three educational attainment measures: high school 
graduation rates (measured as the percent of first-time 9
th grade students who obtain a 
diploma from a CMS high school), the fraction who go on to attend any four-year 
college, and the fraction who attend a four-year college that is defined as very 
competitive by the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges. If the value-added 
estimates are unbiased, they can be interpreted as the expected change in each outcome 
for a randomly chosen student attending that school, relative to the average school in 
CMS. Column 7 reports the average of the five school quality measures, scaled to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. The neighborhood school zones are sorted by 
the average quality measure in Column 7.  
                                                            
13 In principle, we could use data from earlier cohorts of 9
th grade students to make our value-added estimates more precise. However, 
the school choice program introduction was accompanied by the opening of a new high school and sharp capacity and staffing changes 
at many schools in addition to student compositional changes from the large-scale neighborhood rezoning and choice. Thus our 
preferred specification is based only on the post-rezoning cohorts of 2003 and 2004, as school effects may have changed pre- to post-
redistricting.  
14 For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to our value-added estimates as measures of “school quality”. We recognize that there 
are many different dimensions of quality that we cannot measure. 11 
 
The correlation between median household income of families assigned by default to 
each zone school and the average quality measure in Column 7 is 0.49.
15 Column  8 
shows the average of standardized outcomes of students without regression adjustment. 
The correlation between income and mean unadjusted outcomes is higher – at 0.86. 
Interestingly, there is a positive correlation of 0.57 between unadjusted mean outcomes 
and our value-added measure of quality. This could reflect remaining bias from failure to 
fully adjust for differences in student characteristics across schools, but it could also be 
evidence that higher-income families sort into neighborhoods with better schools, or 
schools in such neighborhoods are able to attract better inputs.  
A final way we consider measuring school quality is by using parent’s revealed 
preferences, under the assumption that parents know school’s value-added, and uniformly 
place high weights on this school characteristic. Column 9 shows the share of students 
assigned to each neighborhood school that list that school as their first choice. Families 
who are already guaranteed access to a high-quality school will be less likely than others 
to want to leave it.
16 Reassuringly,  the  probability that a student will choose their 
neighborhood school is positively correlated (0.27) with the school’s average quality 
estimate. However, choosing one’s neighborhood school is much more strongly 
correlated with both income (0.86) and the standardized measure of average outcomes 
(0.79) in Column 8. This raises the question of how much parents actually observe about 
quality and their motivations for choice. Recent evidence indicates that providing 
information on basic measures of quality can have a significant impact on parental 
decision-making (Hastings and Weinstein 2008; Andrabi et al. 2009).
 17 
In this first year of choice, many families in underperforming schools used the 
opportunity to move their children to different high schools. Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics on the types of students who exercised choice. Column 1 presents coefficients 
from a single linear regression of the probability of choosing a non-guaranteed school on 
                                                            
15 As in Table 1, the median household income measure for magnet schools is among attendees, not assigned students, since magnet 
schools do not have catchment areas.  
16 It is not a perfect measure of quality, for 3 reasons: 1) If a family lives much closer to the neighborhood school than to any other, 
they may find it too costly to switch to a better school; 2) Families may care about factors other than quality when selecting a school 
(friends, sports teams, etc.) 3) Families may not observe school quality – in fact, they may sort directly on observed but imperfect 
proxies for quality such as income. 
17 In fact, in modeling school choice, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2008) test several measures of elementary and middle school 
achievement within their choice model and find no impact of traditional value-added calculations on choice, though parents do place 
significant implicit weights on average test scores and racial composition of schools. 12 
 
each independent variable of interest (labeled in each row). The first column of results 
pools all students, while the second column examines students who are assigned to one of 
the four lowest-performing schools on the value-added measures in Table 2. These four 
schools (Waddell, West Mecklenburg, Olympic and Vance) rank at the bottom on both 
the average quality measure in Column 7 of Table 2 and an average of our two main 
educational attainment quality measures – high school graduation and four year college 
attendance value-added (Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2). The patterns of sample selection 
are very similar across the two columns. Lottery applicants live significantly farther away 
than students who choose their neighborhood school - each mile of distance decreases the 
probability that a student will choose their neighborhood school by 2.6 percentage points 
in the pooled sample, and 5.5 percentage points in the “low-quality” subsample. 
Applicants are much more likely to be African American and FRPL, indicating that 
choice in CMS is serving families that cannot afford to vote with their feet (Epple and 
Romano 2003). The pattern of results is nearly identical when we include neighborhood 
school fixed effects rather than restricting the sample to low-quality neighborhood 
schools. Overall, while there is clear sample selection on race and income, lottery 
applicants in both groups have very similar prior test scores as well as disciplinary 
outcomes such as absences and suspensions.  
III. Empirical Strategy 
Of the 20,021 students in the analysis sample, about 48 percent (9,719) chose a school 
other than the neighborhood school to which they were assigned. About 49 percent 
(4,736) of these students applied to schools that were not oversubscribed, and thus were 
automatically admitted. Another 32 percent (3,118) were in priority groups where no one 
was admitted. That leaves the remaining 19 percent (1,865) of students who applied to 
schools where admission was determined by random lottery numbers. Our main results 
are based on this sample of students.  
We begin by following the standard approach in lottery-based studies of school choice, 
which estimate the average impact of winning the lottery across multiple schools and 
grades (Rouse 1998; Hoxby and Rockoff 2004; Cullen, Berry, Jacob and Levitt 2006; 13 
 
Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; 
Deming 2011; Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 2011). We estimate: 
(2)                       Γ    ε   
 
where     is an indicator variable that is equal to one if student   has a winning lottery 
number for admission to school  ,     is a vector of pre-lottery covariates that is included 
only for balance, Γ  is a set of lottery fixed effects, and ε   is a stochastic error term.
18 We 
use only first choices in the model, so the number of observations in the regression is 
simply equal to the number of students in the sample. In principle we could estimate a 
nested model that incorporates multiple choices and accounts for students’ “risk sets” 
(Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011). However, since students who lost the lottery to attend their 
first choice school were generally shut out of other oversubscribed schools, there is 
almost no randomization on 2
nd and 3
rd choices. 
Lottery fixed effects Γ  are necessary to ensure that the ex ante probability of admission 
to a first-choice school does not differ between lottery winners and losers (Rouse 1998). 
If, for example, savvy families had some prior knowledge about the chance of admission, 
they might apply to schools with a higher probability of acceptance. Thus comparing 
winners and losers across lotteries might induce bias. In equation (2),   gives  the 
weighted average of outcome differences summed over each individual lottery, with 
weights equal to        1      where    is the number of applicants and   is  the 
probability of admission (Cullen, Berry, Jacob and Levitt 2006). We can test the validity 
of the randomization by replacing the outcomes     in equation (2) with predetermined 
covariates such as race, gender and prior test scores. If the randomization was conducted 
correctly, winners and losers should be balanced on all characteristics that are fixed at the 
time of the lottery. We test this in Appendix Table 1 and find that only 2 of 20 
                                                            
18 The lotteries were actually conducted at the school-grade-priority group level, so the number of lotteries is greater than the number 
of schools. We suppress subscripts for grade and priority group for notational convenience. The    vector includes controls for race, 
gender, free or reduced price lunch, 8
th grade math and reading test scores, and indicators for the level of math taken in 8
th grade (since 
some students are already enrolled in advanced math). 14 
 
coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level, which is consistent with sampling 
variability.
19 
In Table 4 we show estimates from equation (2) for our five key outcomes of interest – 
9
th grade Math and English test scores, high school graduation, and college attendance 
and persistence.
20 Column 1 shows the mean value of each outcome for students who lost 
the lottery (the “control mean”), and Column 2 shows the mean effect of winning the 
lottery on each outcome with the standard error below in brackets.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual lottery level. We find no average impact of winning the lottery 
on math or English test scores. Imputing the (standardized) 8
th grade math score for 
students who did not take a 9
th grade exam results in a point estimate of 0.000 with a 
standard error of 0.039. Thus we can rule out even relatively small (0.05σ) impacts on 
test scores of winning the lottery.  We also find no difference in English test-taking by 
lottery. However, lottery winners are significantly more likely than lottery losers to take 
an end-of-course (EOC) math exam at all, an important step in preparation for taking 
further advanced math courses and matriculation into post-secondary institutions.
21 
Turning to impacts on post-secondary educational attainment, we find small, positive, 
but only marginally significant impacts of winning the lottery on various measures of 
attainment. Lottery winners are 3.6 percentage points more likely to graduate from high 
school, but this impact is only marginally significant (at the 10% level). Lottery winners 
are 3.2 percentage points more likely to attend a 2-year college, and 2.4 percentage points 
more likely to ever attend a four-year college, but neither estimate is statistically 
significant. However, when we examine the impact on quality of college attended, we do 
we see a relatively large proportional impact on college quality. Lottery winners are 2.4 
percentage points more likely to attend a very competitive college. That estimate is a 
25% increase from the control mean baseline of 9.6 percentage points, and is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Although the 0.8 percentage point increase in most 
                                                            
19 In addition, because we have the lottery numbers, priority groups, and admission outputs from the lottery computer algorithm, we 
are able to verify lottery-by-lottery that indeed lottery numbers were randomly assigned and admission complied with the lottery 
procedures. 
20 We only estimate test score impacts for rising 9
th graders (N=1,146), but we show results for educational attainment outcomes for 
the full sample (N=1,865) of rising 9
th through 11
th grade students. 
21 Lottery winners are only about 2.5 percentage points more likely to remain in a CMS school, so selective attrition can only explain 
about 25% of the difference in test-taking. The remainder is explained by students who are enrolled but not taking math, or taking 
math in a non-standard (usually remedial) course such as pre-Algebra. 15 
 
competitive college attendance is small and statistically insignificant, it is a 33% increase 
from the 2.4 percentage point baseline among lottery losers. 
This impact carries through to matriculation through college as well as degree 
completion. We have college attendance data from the NSC through the Spring of 2011. 
This means that rising 9
th grade students who progress normally through high school 
would be able to attend a maximum of 10 semesters (Fall 2006 to Spring 2011) of 
college. Thus for rising 9
th grade students in 2002 our outcome is completion of a degree 
within 5 years of high school graduation, with additional years available for 10
th and 11
th 
graders. We construct two measures of college persistence – 1) enrollment in at least 4 
semesters; 2) completion of a degree by the Spring of 2011. In the third panel of Table 4 
we examine impacts of winning the lottery on these two measures of persistence. The 
results are similar to the attendance outcomes. The impacts on persistence are 
proportionally very similar to the impacts on attendance for very competitive colleges, 
while the impact of winning the lottery on persistence in any 4 year college is near zero 
and statistically insignificant. 
Next we examine the impact of winning the lottery for different groups of students. We 
estimate equation (2) for the five main outcomes in the paper, and we add interactions 
between winning the lottery and indicator variables for race (nonwhite/white), free or 
reduced price lunch, and gender. Table 5 presents those results in a similar format to 
Table 3, with the addition in Column 5 of an F-test for equality of coefficients across 
groups. The point estimates for all five outcomes are greater for white students than for 
nonwhite students, although only the difference for 9
th grade English score is significant 
at even the 10 percent level. The two measures of college attendance are positive and 
significantly different from zero for free-lunch-eligible students. Interestingly, free-lunch-
eligible students gain on all three measures of educational attainment despite negative 
impacts on both Math and English test scores.  Finally, we note the large and statistically 
significant difference in impacts on four-year college attendance for girls versus boys. 
Girls who win the lottery are about 7 percentage points more likely to attend a four year 
college. In contrast, boys are actually slightly less likely (but not significant) to attend a 
four year college. This matches the growing body of evidence that girls benefit 
academically more than boys from educational interventions (Hastings et al. 2006; 16 
 
Anderson 2008; Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009; Deming 2009; Jackson 2010; Lavy, 
Silva and Weinhardt 2009). Overall, while there are some interesting differences in 
outcomes across groups, most do not pass the threshold of statistical significance.  
Moreover, interpreting the pattern of results across outcomes and groups of students is 
difficult absent a theory linking demographics to reasons for school selection, to school 
characteristics to academic outcomes. If parents choose schools for both academic and 
non-academic outcomes (e.g. graduation rates versus proximity or athletics), then choice 
can lead to gains or losses in academic outcomes (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008). In a 
simple selection model of school choice based on expected gains on academic and non-
academic dimensions, if student academic gains are increasing in school quality, we 
would expect to see gains among students who choose to attend much higher quality 
schools. More generally, since the impact of winning the lottery can be thought of as the 
difference in quality between a student’s choice school and the quality of their outside 
option, significant treatment effects may be hard to detect if the treatment size is small. In 
other words, if students who lose the lottery to attend a high quality school are able to 
find another comparable alternative, the estimated impacts will be small even if the 
school itself is quite good.  
For these reasons we split the sample of lottery applicants by the quality of their 
neighborhood school, where quality is defined by the value-added estimates in Table 2. 
Because every student who applies to the same school (within a given priority group) has 
the same ex ante chance of admission, the quality of an applicant’s neighborhood school 
is a valid covariate on which to split the sample, similar to race or prior test scores. 
Furthermore, this setup allows us to compare treatment effects for students who applied 
to the same school but had outside options of different quality. Specifically, we estimate: 
(3)                     
                 
         
            Γ    ε  . 
 
   
   and    
  are indicator variables equal to one if a student is zoned to neighborhood 
schools of “low” and “high” quality respectively, and the rest of the notation is identical 
to equation (2). Since equation (3) controls for lottery fixed effects, allowing the impact 
of winning the lottery to vary with    is equivalent to allowing it to vary with          . 17 
 
We stratify every school into one of the two categories based on several different metrics, 
including our value-added estimates of school quality and revealed preference. We 
classify the four lowest-ranked schools on the average value-added “quality” measure in 
Column 7 of Table 2 as the “low quality” sample. Students from all other neighborhood 
school zones are in the “high quality” sample. Notably, the bottom four schools on the 
overall quality measure are also the bottom four on the two main measures of 
matriculation – high school graduation and four-year college attendance, and they are 
near the bottom in terms of revealed preference as well. We can interpret        as a 
differences-in-differences (DID) estimate of the relative impact of coming from a low 
quality neighborhood school on winning the lottery. Since equation (9) includes lottery 
fixed effects, we are comparing applicants to the same school and in the same grade who 
came from different neighborhood schools.  Thus, the results allow for a direct test of the 
differential impact of choice for students whose neighborhood schools do a poor job of 
graduating their students and sending them to college.  In addition to stratifying the 
analysis by neighborhood school quality, we can allow the lottery treatment effect to vary 
continuously with our estimate of the school quality differential              : 
(4)                                                                   Γ    ε  . 
 
Intuitively, if the estimated school quality difference is a good approximation of the 
impact that each school has on its students, then the impact of winning the lottery should 
be larger for applicants with a larger estimated quality difference. If all students were 
randomly assigned to schools, then the impact of switching a student from school   to 
school   would be        . In that case the specification in equation (4) would yield a 
coefficient of zero on the main effect and one on the interaction term. On the other hand, 
if the quality differential does not do a good job of explaining the lottery treatment effect, 
the slope coefficient   will be close to zero and   in equations (2) and (4) will be similar. 
This specification will also address whether school choice programs can effectively raise 
matriculation rates for students slated to attend schools with poor matriculation records.
22  
                                                            
22 We also estimate similar specifications where winning the lottery is interacted with the probability that students choose their 
neighborhood school. We could think of this as an alternative “revealed preference” measure of school quality that is robust to 
misspecification of S, and find similar results. 18 
 
IV. Results 
The four lowest-ranked schools on the measure of average quality in Column 7 of 
Table 2 are Waddell, West Mecklenburg, Olympic and Vance. Students who live in one 
of these four schools’ neighborhood catchment areas are in the “low quality” sample, and 
all other students are in the “high quality” sample. In Appendix Tables 2 we report results 
for the four lowest-ranked schools on the revealed preference measure of quality. Overall, 
the pattern of results is not sensitive to small changes in the choice of schools.  
Table 6 shows the impact of winning the lottery on enrollment and school 
characteristics. The first row examines selective attrition from the lottery sample. We find 
that lottery winners in both samples are about 2.5 to 3 percentage points more likely to 
still be enrolled in a CMS school in the Fall of 2002. Neither coefficient is statistically 
significant. While the impact on selective attrition is small, it could bias our results. 
However, we find that the main results are relatively robust to a variety of assumptions 
about attrition.
23 In the second row we see that the first stage impact of winning the 
lottery on fall enrollment is strong in both samples, suggesting that the offer of admission 
was relatively attractive. As indicated by the control means, however, a significant share 
of lottery losers still managed to enroll in their chosen school. This could happen because 
the student moved into the neighborhood over the summer, or because they were 
admitted subsequently off of a waitlist that we do not observe. Among lottery losers, 
students who subsequently enroll in their chosen school (“always takers” in the 
terminology of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)) have higher family incomes, are more 
likely to be white, and have substantially higher average test scores and rates of high 
school graduation and college attendance. This holds even with the low quality 
neighborhood school sample. Lottery winners with low-quality neighborhood schools are 
about 36 percentage points more likely to attend a magnet school, compared to about 25 
percentage points in the “high quality” sample. This helps to explain why there is little 
change in the demographic composition of lottery winners’ schools, in either group.  
                                                            
23 We re-estimate the results in Table 7 assuming values of zero for students who were missing in the Fall of 2002. The impact on 
high school graduation drops by about 35 percent but is still statistically significant in the “low-quality” sample. This assumption is 
probably too restrictive, especially since we possess information on the college-going of students who leave prior to the Fall of 2002 
and we still find impacts on four-year college attendance. 19 
 
Finally, we examine the impact of winning the lottery on school quality. In the last five 
rows of Table 6, the outcome is the “value-added” school quality estimate from Table 2 
for each of the five main outcomes in the paper. If these measures were unbiased 
estimates of school quality, they would represent the average impact of the school on 
student outcomes. Overall, lottery winners in the “low-quality” sample attend schools 
with similar math and English value-added but significantly higher value-added on 
measures of educational attainment compared to their peers who lost the lottery. In 
contrast, lottery winners in the “high-quality” sample did not attend schools with higher 
value-added on any of the five measures, and the impact on 9
th grade math value-added is 
negative and statistically significant. This may suggest that by high school, parents are 
focused more on matriculation from high school and to college than on standardized test 
scores as a measure of school quality. 
Recall that because these are value-added measures, we would expect the impact for a 
randomly chosen (not self-selected) student to be simply equal to the coefficient on each 
outcome if the assumptions under which the value-added is calculated hold. Thus the 
estimates in Table 6 predict that lottery winners in the low-quality sample will be about 5 
percentage points more likely to graduate from high school and attend a four-year 
college, but will score no higher on math and English tests. They also predict that in the 
“high-quality” sample, lottery winners will have modestly lower test scores and show no 
gains on measures of educational attainment.  
Table 7 presents the results from estimation of equation (3) for the main outcomes of 
the paper. The pattern of results is striking. Nearly all of the impacts are larger in the low 
quality neighborhood school subsample, and the difference between the samples is 
statistically significant for over half of the outcomes and all of our main measures of 
educational attainment – high school graduation, four-year college attendance and degree 
completion. The impact of winning the lottery on 9
th grade test scores is indistinguishable 
from zero for students in both samples. The main findings of this paper are that lottery 
winners from low quality neighborhood school zones are 8.7 percentage points more 
likely to graduate from high school, 6.6 percentage points more likely to attend a four-
year college, and 5.7 percentage points more likely to earn a four-year college degree. 
However, unlike the results for high school graduation and college attendance, lottery 20 
 
winners from high-quality neighborhood schools are actually more likely to attend a very 
competitive college, although we cannot reject that the two coefficients are equal. 
Furthermore, the gap between the two samples for very competitive colleges narrows for 
the persistence measure and actually reverses for degree completion.   
While the impact on four-year college attendance and degree completion for lottery 
winners from low-quality neighborhood school zones is proportionally fairly large (about 
20 percent and 35 percent of the respective control means), the impacts for most 
competitive colleges are an order of magnitude larger. The point estimates for attendance, 
persistence and completion are small (between 1.7 and 2.1 percentage points), they 
represent more than a doubling of the probability that a student will attend and obtain a 
degree from one of these elite institutions. Lottery winners in the high quality sample are 
about 3.5 percentage points less likely to complete a four-year college degree and 2.1 
percentage points more likely to complete a two-year degree, although neither estimate is 
significantly different from zero.  
While we have limited evidence on the things that schools did to increase the 
educational attainment of their students, we find that lottery winners from low-quality 
neighborhood schools had better performance in high school on a range of mediating 
outcomes. We investigate these outcomes in Table 8. When looking at course-taking, we 
restrict our attention to math since the courses were more likely to have a standard 
curriculum, and because of recent evidence that mathematics courses may increase 
earnings later in life (Goodman 2009). Lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood 
schools had significantly higher grade point averages overall and in math and science 
courses, and they took more math courses overall. They also had significantly fewer 
absences from school in the first school year after the lottery. We find some evidence of 
reductions in absences in later years, but the estimates are imprecise. In contrast, we 
found no evidence of any impacts on mediating outcomes in the “high quality” sample.  
Notably, the differences across the two samples on the mediating outcomes are fairly 
large, which makes sense because schools have much more control over outcomes such 
as course-taking and academic preparation than over the college selection and attendance 
process. 21 
 
The evidence on mediating outcomes in Table 8 suggests that lottery winners in the 
low-quality sample experience real human capital gains that make them more college-
ready. We investigate this further in the bottom panel of Table 8 by estimating impacts on 
persistence and degree completion, conditional on enrollment. All else equal, we might 
think that students who are on the margin of college enrollment would have lower rates 
of persistence since they are on average less prepared. Thus, if “better” schools raise 
college enrollment by shepherding more marginal students into college, we might expect 
to see lower conditional persistence rates among lottery winners in the “low quality” 
sample. In fact, we find the opposite. Among students who attend a four-year college, 
lottery winners in the “low-quality” sample are about 7.5 percentage points more likely to 
complete a degree, although the estimate is not significantly different from zero. Among 
very competitive college attendees, however, lottery winners are nearly 30 percentage 
points more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree, although the standard error is large 
because of the small sample. Interestingly, conditional completion rates are lower in the 
high-quality sample, although the estimates are imprecise.  
Finally, we formalize the comparison between school value-added and the lottery 
treatment effects by allowing for a continuous relationship between the estimated school 
quality difference and the impact of a randomly assigned offer of admission. We estimate 
equation (4), where the impact of winning the lottery is interacted with            , the 
difference between the value-added of the school to which a student applies and their 
neighborhood school. If all students were randomly assigned to schools, then the impact 
of switching a student from school   to school   would be          . In that case the 
specification in equation (4) would yield a coefficient of zero on the main effect  , and 
one on the interaction term  . A rejection of this “random assignment” joint hypothesis 
can be interpreted in two related ways: 1) that our estimates of school quality are biased 
by unobserved sorting, or 2) that the impact of winning the lottery for applicants differs 
from the impact for non-applicants. This would be true if, for example, students apply 
because they expect to have a particularly good idiosyncratic match with their choice 
school that would not generalize to a randomly selected student in CMS. 
One potential complication is that students who lose the lottery to attend their first 
choice often attended another school that was not oversubscribed (as explained in Section 22 
 
I, virtually no students were admitted to oversubscribed schools unless they listed that 
school as their first choice). Since we are interested in the school quality lottery winners 
would have experienced had they lost, we construct an estimate of counterfactual school 
quality by using applicants’ second and third choices. If their second choice was not 
oversubscribed (or if it was their neighborhood school), then we use the quality 
difference between their first and second choice in equation (4). Similarly, if their second 
choice was oversubscribed, and no one was admitted, we move to their third choice, and 
then to their neighborhood school (the implicit fourth choice for all students). In the small 
number of cases where there was a lottery in the 2
nd or 3
rd rounds, we use a weighted 
average quality difference where the weights are the probability of admission.
24 
In Table 9 we estimate versions of equation (4) that differ only in the covariates used to 
adjust the estimates of        that we produced in equation (1) and Table 2. Column 1 
contains the baseline model without any interaction term and is identical to the results in 
Table 4. Column 2 interacts an indicator for winning the lottery with unadjusted school-
level means for each outcome, which are just demeaned versions of the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1. The coefficients on the interactions are significantly different from 
zero only for the 9
th grade math and high school graduation outcomes, and the “random 
assignment” hypothesis is strongly rejected for all five outcomes.   
Column 3 shows results where winning the lottery is interacted with the school quality 
estimates in Table 2, which include demographic covariates and polynomials in 8
th grade 
math and reading test scores. The performance of the model improves dramatically, and 
we fail to reject the “random assignment” hypothesis for 9
th grade math, high school 
graduation and four-year college attendance. The school quality estimates do a 
particularly good job of predicting gains in high school graduation and four-year college 
attendance. The coefficients on the main effects are 0.015 and 0.005 respectively, and the 
interaction terms are 0.937 and 0.866. This says that students who win the lottery to 
attend a school with identical estimated quality to the school they would have attended if 
they lost are 1.5 percentage points more likely to graduate and 0.5 percentage points more 
                                                            
24 Formally, we estimate the school quality differential as VA(W)-VA(L) where VA(L) = p2*(VA2) + (1-p2)*[(p3*VA2) + (1-
p3)*VA(n)]. VA(W) and VA(L) are value-added if the students wins and loses the lottery respectively, p2 and p3 are the probability 
of admission to the students’ 2
nd and 3
rd choices, and VA2, VA3 and VA(n) are value-added for the 2
nd choice, 3
rd choice and 
neighborhood schools respectively. Because students list their choices prior to randomization, examining treatment effect 
heterogeneity by variation in pre-lottery choice sets does not bias the results. Estimates using just the neighborhood school as the 
counterfactual are very similar. 23 
 
likely to attend a four-year college (so some self-selection on match quality or 
misspecification or remains). However, for every 1 percentage point of value-added 
gained, lottery winners are 0.94 and 0.87 percentage points more likely to graduate from 
high school and attend a four-year college. The fact that both are significantly different 
from zero is a rejection of the null hypothesis that value-added estimates have no power 
to predict the treatment effect of winning the lottery. 
Column 4 makes use of a richer model of value-added that controls for 3
rd through 8
th 
grade test scores plus absences, out-of-school suspensions and grade repetition in middle 
school. Perhaps surprisingly, these additional covariates have very little impact, 
suggesting that a basic set of controls adequately controls for selection for three of the 
five main outcomes. Column 5 presents estimates from a model where winning the 
lottery is interacted with the share of students assigned to a neighborhood school that 
apply to attend another school. Here we measure school quality by relying on applicants’ 
revealed preferences for schools other than their own. The pattern of results closely 
mirrors Columns 3 and 4, suggesting that our estimates of school quality conform closely 
to parental preferences for schools. 
While school value-added does a good job of predicting treatment effects for 9
th grade 
math, high school graduation and four-year college attendance, it does a very poor job of 
predicting 9
th grade English scores and very competitive college attendance. This could 
be because other factors such as family influence or an idiosyncratic match between the 
student and the school are important, or because we cannot adequately control for the 
determinants of those outcomes, and so      is misspecified. More generally, families that 
choose schools which appear no better on our measures of school quality may benefit 
from choice in ways that we do not observe. 
For our main results, we interpret the within-lottery difference in outcomes for students 
who are assigned to “low-quality” neighborhood schools as evidence of the importance of 
school quality. One possible problem with this interpretation is that students from low-
quality neighborhood schools might also have much better idiosyncratic matches than 
students from high-quality neighborhood schools, within each lottery. Since about 43 
percent of first choices were one of the three magnet schools located in the inner city, we 
might be concerned that applicants from low-quality neighborhood schools had 24 
 
particularly good potential matches in these schools and programs, compared to the other 
students from their neighborhoods. However, nearly all the main results in the paper hold 
up when we exclude magnet applications from the analysis.
25 A related concern is that 
10
th and 11
th grade applicants might be more likely to sort on idiosyncratic matches, yet 
we find that the pattern of results holds when we restrict everything to rising 9
th grade 
applicants. 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we study the impact of winning an admissions lottery to attend a public 
high school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Students who exercised choice were more likely 
to come from minority and low-income backgrounds, and from low-performing home-
school neighborhood assignment zones. We match school choices and lottery outcomes 
to data on college enrollment and degree completion from the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), and we estimate the impact of winning the lottery to attend a 
student’s first choice school on long-term measures of educational attainment. We find 
that lottery winners who are assigned to low-quality neighborhood schools are more 
likely to graduate from high school, attend a four-year college, and earn a bachelor’s 
degree. They are about twice as likely to earn a degree from an elite institution such as 
UNC-Chapel Hill or Duke. In contrast, we find no evidence of benefits for lottery 
winners from higher-quality neighborhood schools. This represents the first evidence of 
the causal impact of a school choice policy on long-run postsecondary attainment.  
Furthermore, we find that value-added measures of school quality which control for a 
prior test score and a basic set of demographic covariates do a good job of predicting the 
treatment effects from lottery-based random assignment. If it can be replicated in other 
settings, this finding has important implications for the external validity of studies of 
school choice that exploit lottery-based randomization. The focus on students with low-
quality neighborhood schools may also have important implications for the patterns of 
heterogeneity in other studies. The quality of a student’s default option matters just as 
much as the quality of the school they choose. 
                                                            
25 Results are available upon request. The only difference is in selective college enrollment and degree completion, where excluding 
the magnets makes the estimates in the low quality sample insignificant but still significantly larger than for the HQ sample in many 
cases.  25 
 
The results show that school choice can have an important and long-lasting impact on 
educational attainment, but only when students gain access to schools that are better on 
observed dimensions of quality. In this setting, switching disadvantaged youth from one 
of the lowest quality high schools in a large urban district to an average-quality high 
school closed about 75 percent of the black-white gap in high school graduation and 
about 23 percent of the gap in bachelor’s degree completion. This shows that improving 
the quality of urban high schools, while difficult to accomplish in practice, would lessen 
racial and socioeconomic inequality and generate potentially large gains in the stock of 
college-educated labor. 
Unfortunately, we cannot say much about the underlying explanation for the gains 
experienced by lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood schools. Because the 
choice schools were often magnet schools, with specialized programs such as career 
academies, arts education, and intensive college prep, the benefits could come primarily 
from improved student engagement in high school. It is possible that having 
demographically similar but more able peers led to increased student learning and 
engagement inside the classroom. Better peers could also have an impact on behavior 
inside and outside of the classroom. The impacts on mediating variables as early as 9
th 
grade are inconsistent with a scenario where “better” schools are simply more organized 
at getting students to surmount administrative hurdles such as accumulating enough 
credits in the right high school courses, or filling out college applications and financial 
aid forms. That could generate increases in educational attainment, but would be unlikely 
to raise grade point averages, increase math course-taking, reduce absences and increase 
college persistence conditional on enrollment. 
For students with low-quality neighborhood schools, winning the lottery amounts to 
moving them from one of the lowest-quality public schools to an average-quality school 
within a large urban district. The schools had access to similar levels of resources and 
were managed under the same set of rules and constraints. Remarkably, the change in 
student racial composition and measures of peer quality such as average test scores was 
quite small. While we cannot eliminate the possibility that lottery applicants are different 
in unobserved ways from other students in CMS, the strong correlation between 26 
 
observational value-added measures and the lottery treatment effect suggests that the 
results might generalize to students outside of the applicant pool.   
Interestingly, the performance of value-added measures of school quality is best for 
high school graduation and four-year college attendance, middling for math, and very 
poor for competitive college attendance and English test scores. Provided that these 
results could be replicated in other settings, they have important implications for the 
design of school accountability policies. It makes little sense to hold schools accountable 
for outcomes that they cannot control. School quality estimates that approximate impacts 
from random assignment are less likely to be biased by unobserved determinants of 
achievement, and thus may serve as better candidates for judging performance. 
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TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL 
                College Attendance   
 
Median HH 
Income  Nonwhite  Free Lunch  9th Grade 
Math 
9th Grade 
English    HS Graduate  Any 4 Year  Very 
Competitive 
Most 
Competitive  N 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Panel A. Neighborhood School                       
Providence  94,799  0.06  0.03  0.41  0.79    0.82  0.75  0.49  0.15  1,364 
South Mecklenburg  72,830  0.15  0.16  0.24  0.58    0.79  0.66  0.39  0.10  1,590 
North Mecklenburg  68,275  0.31  0.24  -0.26  0.25    0.76  0.58  0.27  0.09  1,303 
Hopewell  67,473  0.31  0.27  -0.31  0.19    0.73  0.54  0.24  0.07  1,410 
Butler  66,843  0.13  0.16  0.07  0.58    0.76  0.57  0.27  0.08  1,272 
Myers Park  61,782  0.32  0.33  0.02  0.36    0.74  0.60  0.38  0.12  1,422 
Olympic  50,914  0.52  0.50  -0.40  -0.15    0.69  0.41  0.12  0.03  1,148 
East Mecklenburg  50,806  0.45  0.47  -0.20  0.15    0.64  0.44  0.19  0.06  1,376 
Vance  50,394  0.66  0.54  -0.51  -0.08    0.69  0.44  0.12  0.05  1,979 
Independence  48,664  0.58  0.53  -0.51  0.04    0.69  0.41  0.10  0.03  1,804 
Waddell  45,536  0.58  0.61  -0.53  -0.22    0.63  0.31  0.08  0.02  842 
Garinger  38,359  0.73  0.71  -0.60  -0.25    0.64  0.35  0.07  0.03  1,331 
West Mecklenburg  38,305  0.70  0.71  -0.53  -0.43    0.60  0.29  0.06  0.02  1,923 
West Charlotte  27,278  0.91  0.92  -0.83  -0.67    0.52  0.22  0.02  0.01  1,257 
                       
Panel B. Magnet Schools                       
Harding University  43,643  0.68  0.55  -0.28  0.15    0.75  0.53  0.14  0.07  1,016 
Berry Academy  41,568  0.79  0.76  -0.61  -0.42    0.68  0.41  0.07  0.02  691 
Northwest Arts  52,654  0.39  0.38  -0.69  0.15    0.72  0.48  0.17  0.06  454 
                       
Correlation with Income    -0.94  -0.96  0.87  0.91    0.86  0.92  0.93  0.90   
Notes: All data are based on the students that are assigned to each neighborhood school in the Fall of 2002, not the students that actually attend. Column 1 is the average value of median household income 
for families in each neighborhood school zone, based on the 2000 Census and calculated at the tract level. Columns 4 and 5 show students' average 9th grade math and English end-of-course (EOC) exams. 
College competitiveness measures are defined by the Barron's Rankings. See the text of the paper for details. 
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TABLE 2 - NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL QUALITY ESTIMATES 
    School Quality Measures (Value-Added)       
 
Median HH 
Income  9th Grade Math 9th Grade 
English  HS Graduate  4 Year College  Very Competitive  Avg. Standardized 
Value-Added (Quality)
Avg. of Standardized 
Outcomes (in levels) Chose Neighb. School 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Panel A. Neighborhood School                   
South Mecklenburg  72,799  0.112  0.057  0.053  0.042  0.050  1.388  1.037  0.70 
North Mecklenburg  68,319  -0.008  0.032  0.047  0.056  0.037  0.967  0.940  0.51 
Myers Park  61,891  0.027  -0.020  0.011  0.013  0.055  0.532  1.266  0.59 
Providence  94,801  0.004  -0.030  0.002  0.032  0.049  0.465  1.758  0.92 
Garinger  38,359  0.059  -0.011  0.020  0.006  -0.004  0.232  -1.065  0.18 
Independence  48,669  -0.039  0.082  0.005  -0.005  -0.028  0.110  -0.384  0.59 
West Charlotte  27,267  0.075  -0.097  -0.024  0.015  0.023  0.061  -1.372  0.22 
East Mecklenburg  50,838  0.078  0.039  -0.045  -0.017  -0.011  0.019  -0.049  0.45 
Hopewell  67,493  -0.085  -0.039  0.004  -0.013  -0.031  -0.466  0.346  0.69 
Butler  66,871  -0.003  0.029  0.003  -0.043  -0.071  -0.480  0.634  0.57 
Vance  50,487  -0.111  -0.034  -0.041  -0.026  -0.014  -0.589  -0.648  0.55 
Olympic  50,942  -0.044  -0.096  -0.022  -0.046  -0.046  -0.845  -0.480  0.42 
West Mecklenburg  38,320  0.046  -0.117  -0.046  -0.052  -0.034  -0.898  -1.179  0.28 
Waddell  45,537  -0.146  -0.092  -0.066  -0.049  -0.025  -1.386  -1.242  0.53 
                   
Panel B. Magnet Schools                   
Harding University  43,643  0.054  0.039  0.016  0.053  -0.005  -0.754  0.639   
Berry Academy  41,568  -0.091  -0.114  0.006  0.007  -0.013  -0.669  -0.567   
Northwest Arts  52,654  -0.055  0.159  0.004  0.029  0.004  -0.176  0.523   
                   
Correlation with Income  -0.01  0.30  0.43  0.28  0.36  0.49  0.86  0.90 
Notes: Column 1 is the average value of median household income for families in each neighborhood school zone, based on the 2000 Census and calculated at the tract level. Columns 2 through 6 contain value-added 
measures of school quality for the five main outcomes in the paper. See equation (1) in the paper and the accompanying discussion for details. The table is sorted by Column 7, which is the normalized average of the 
five quality measures in columns 2 through 6. Column 9  is a "revealed preference" measure of school quality - the probability that students assigned to each neighborhood school will choose to attend it. 31 
 
 
TABLE 3 - SELECTION INTO THE LOTTERY SAMPLE 
 
Outcome is chose non-neighborhood school  All  Low Quality   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
Distance to Neighborhood School  4.102  0.026***  4.169  0.055***   
    [0.001]    [0.003]   
           
Male  0.509  -0.021***  0.514  -0.016   
    [0.007]    [0.013]   
           
African-American  0.308  0.206***  0.544  0.111***   
    [0.010]    [0.017]   
           
Latino  0.035  0.047**  0.047  0.019   
    [0.022]    [0.037]   
           
Free/Reduced Lunch  0.332  0.140***  0.564  0.035**   
    [0.010]    [0.016]   
           
8th Grade Math  0.094  0.011*  -0.283  0.035***   
    [0.006]    [0.011]   
           
8th Grade Reading  0.139  0.009  -0.250  -0.006   
    [0.006]    [0.010]   
           
8th Grade Days Absent  8.681  0.001  9.534  0.001   
    [0.001]    [0.001]   
           
8th Grade Days Suspended  1.139  -0.001  1.566  -0.001   
    [0.001]    [0.002]   
           
Sample Size  17,881    5,320     
Notes:  Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the covariate in each row for students who listed their 
neighborhood school as their first choice, in the high and low quality neighborhood school samples 
respectively. Columns 2 and 4 are coefficients from one regression of the probability of choice on the 
covariates in the indicated rows, interacted with an indicator variable for whether the student lives in a 
neighborhood that is zoned to a "low quality school" - see the text for details in this definition.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY ON MAIN OUTCOMES 
  Control Mean  Estimate 
  (1)  (2) 
Panel A. High School Outcomes     
9th Grade Math Score  -0.441  -0.025 
    [0.051] 
9th Grade English Score  -0.152  -0.017 
    [0.044] 
Taken 9th Grade Math Exam  0.815  0.089*** 
    [0.022] 
Grad from CMS High School  0.601  0.036* 
    [0.020] 
Panel B. College Attendance     
Any 2 year college  0.530  0.032 
    [0.031] 
Any 4 year college  0.367  0.024 
    [0.029] 
Very Competitive  0.096  0.024** 
    [0.011] 
Most Competitive  0.024  0.008 
    [0.007] 
Panel C. Persistence (4+ sems)     
Any 2 year college  0.197  0.018 
    [0.029] 
Any 4 year college  0.283  -0.005 
    [0.026] 
Very Competitive  0.080  0.022* 
    [0.012] 
Most Competitive  0.021  0.005 
    [0.006] 
Panel D. Earned a Degree     
Any 2 year college  0.026  0.011 
    [0.013] 
Any 4 year college  0.177  0.005 
    [0.015] 
Very Competitive  0.065  0.014* 
    [0.017] 
Most Competitive  0.020  0.002 
    [0.007] 
Sample Size  1865   
Notes: Columns 1 is the mean value of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. 
Column 2 is an estimate of the effect of winning the lottery from equation (2) in the paper, with lottery 
fixed effects and basic covariates for balance. Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and 
are clustered at the lottery level. "Very Competitive" and "Most Competitive" colleges are defined by 
the Barron's rankings. See the text for details.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 33 
 
 
TABLE 5 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY BY SUBGROUPS 
  Nonwhite    White    F(equal) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
               
9th Grade English Score  -0.389  -0.063*    0.224  0.090    0.078 
    [0.035]      [0.082]     
9th Grade Math Score  -0.657  -0.043    -0.133  0.014    0.708 
    [0.055]      [0.126]     
Grad from CMS High School  0.597  0.022    0.607  0.063*    0.389 
    [0.028]      [0.033]     
Attended a 4 Year College  0.333  0.013    0.411  0.044    0.311 
    [0.032]      [0.037]     
Very Competitive  0.035  0.019    0.175  0.034    0.714 
    [0.017]      [0.029]     
  Free Lunch    Not Free Lunch     
9th Grade English Score  -0.378  -0.084    0.218  0.121*    0.007 
    [0.050]      [0.064]     
9th Grade Math Score  -0.655  -0.055    -0.124  0.032    0.255 
    [0.038]      [0.087]     
Grad from CMS High School  0.537  0.055    0.683  0.003    0.407 
    [0.032]      [0.043]     
Attended a 4 Year College  0.258  0.042**    0.506  -0.009    0.193 
    [0.020]      [0.053]     
Very Competitive  0.028  0.028**    0.182  0.017    0.637 
    [0.010]      [0.021]     
  Male    Female     
9th Grade English Score  -0.227  -0.036    -0.073  0.009    0.586 
    [0.052]      [0.065]     
9th Grade Math Score  -0.465  -0.036    -0.415  -0.010    0.595 
    [0.053]      [0.059]     
Grad from CMS High School  0.541  0.030    0.669  0.044    0.763 
    [0.024]      [0.036]     
Attended a 4 Year College  0.342  -0.014    0.395  0.071***    0.008 
    [0.035]      [0.025]     
Very Competitive  0.078  0.021    0.116  0.028*    0.804 
    [0.018]      [0.016]     
Sample Size  1865             
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. Columns 2 and 4 are 
estimates from a form of equation (2) in the paper, with a full set of indicator variables for lottery status and low or high quality 
neighborhood school. Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and are clustered at the lottery level. Column 5 contains 
the p-value for an F-test that columns (2) and (4) are equal. "Very Competitive" College is defined by the Barron's rankings - see 
the text of the paper for a list of NC colleges that apply. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 34 
 
TABLE 6 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY ON ENROLLMENT AND SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS 
  HQ Neighborhood School    LQ Neighborhood School    F(equal) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
Panel A. Enrollment in Fall 2002               
In Any CMS School  0.922  0.027    0.918  0.029    0.933 
    [0.020]      [0.023]     
In 1st Choice  0.370  0.545***    0.353  0.564***    0.753 
    [0.080]      [0.057]     
Neighborhood School  0.382  -0.365***    0.463  -0.397***    0.501 
    [0.052]      [0.039]     
Magnet School  0.121  0.252*    0.127  0.365***    0.195 
    [0.125]      [0.117]     
Distance to Fall 2002 school  6.38  1.65***    6.07  1.25*    0.464 
    [0.56]      [0.63]     
Percent African-American  0.406  0.054    0.535  -0.022    0.065 
    [0.046]      [0.048]     
Percent Free Lunch  0.448  0.029    0.587  -0.053    0.024 
    [0.042]      [0.044]     
Avg. 8th Grade Math Score  0.042  -0.022    -0.215  0.146**    0.003 
    [0.072]      [0.070]     
Panel B. School Quality Measures               
9th Grade Math  0.044  -0.086***    -0.046  -0.003    0.011 
    [0.022]      [0.043]     
9th Grade English  0.020  -0.049    -0.060  0.011    0.015 
    [0.032]      [0.037]     
High School Graduation  0.001  0.007    -0.033  0.048***    0.000 
    [0.006]      [0.008]     
4 Year College Attendance  -0.002  0.001    -0.032  0.050***    0.000 
    [0.010]      [0.007]     
Very Competitive College  -0.005  -0.013    -0.026  0.025***    0.001 
    [0.008]      [0.008]     
Sample Size  1,070      795       
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. Columns 2 and 4 are estimates 
from equation (3) in the paper, with a full set of indicator variables for lottery status and low or high quality neighborhood school. 
Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and are clustered at the lottery level. Column 5 contains the p-value for an F-test that 
columns (2) and (4) are equal.  The quality estimates for each school come from Table 2. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 7 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY BY NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL QUALITY 
  HQ Neighborhood 
School    LQ Neighborhood 
School    F(equal
) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
               
9th Grade English Score  -0.124  -0.009    -0.164  -0.023    0.896 
    [0.062]      [0.074]     
9th Grade Math (impute 8th)  -0.629  -0.061    -0.606  0.057    0.087 
    [0.045]      [0.047]     
Graduated from CMS High School  0.623  -0.003    0.568  0.087**    0.079 
    [0.025]      [0.037]     
Attended a 2 Year College  0.533  0.005    0.525  0.066    0.211 
    [0.035]      [0.042]     
Attended a 4 Year College  0.382  -0.014    0.345  0.072*    0.043 
    [0.034]      [0.038]     
Very Competitive  0.089  0.028**    0.106  0.020    0.532 
    [0.011]      [0.015]     
Most Competitive  0.027  -0.002    0.019  0.021**    0.079 
    [0.007]      [0.010]     
Persistence (4+ sems)               
Any 2 year college  0.199  0.010    0.194  0.037    0.502 
    [0.039]      [0.026]     
Any 4 year college  0.300  -0.012    0.259  0.031    0.144 
    [0.029]      [0.027]     
Very Competitive  0.077  0.022*    0.084  0.037**    0.304 
    [0.012]      [0.013]     
Most Competitive  0.023  -0.003    0.017  0.018**    0.078 
    [0.006]      [0.009]     
Earned a Degree               
Any 2 year college  0.023  0.021    0.029  -0.003    0.211 
    [0.013]      [0.017]     
Any 4 year college  0.194  -0.035    0.151  0.057**    0.008 
    [0.022]      [0.021]     
Very Competitive  0.070  -0.003    0.058  0.035***    0.007 
    [0.009]      [0.011]     
Most Competitive  0.023  -0.010    0.014  0.017*    0.027 
    [0.007]      [0.009]     
Sample Size  1,070      795       
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. 
Columns 2 and 4 are estimates from equation (3) in the paper, with a full set of indicator variables for lottery 
status and low or high quality neighborhood school. Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and 
are clustered at the lottery level. Column 5 contains the p-value for an F-test that columns (2) and (4) are 
equal.  Competitive colleges are defined by the Barron's rankings - see the text of the paper for details. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 8 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY ON MEDIATING OUTCOMES 
  HQ Neighborhood 
School    LQ Neighborhood School    F(equal) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
               
Grade Point Average  2.047  0.066*    2.098  0.142***    0.157 
    [0.034]      [0.047]     
GPA -Math and Science  1.690  0.005    1.680  0.125**    0.026 
    [0.034]      [0.056]     
Number of Math Courses  2.652  0.022    2.679  0.217**    0.165 
    [0.073]      [0.093]     
Took Math Every Year  0.633  0.001    0.600  0.079*    0.273 
    [0.041]      [0.039]     
Absences in 2002-2003  11.65  -0.11    11.88  -1.75*    0.122 
    [0.75]      [0.96]     
Suspensions in 2002-2003  2.20  -0.75*    2.09  -0.79    0.939 
    [0.39]      [0.53]     
College Persistence 
(conditional)               
Any 4 Year College  0.785  0.007    0.750  -0.052    0.325 
              N=636    [0.048]      [0.057]     
Very Competitive college  0.868  0.063    0.745  0.322*    0.164 
              N=151    [0.097]      [0.176]     
Degree Completion 
(conditional) 
             
Any 4 Year College  0.496  -0.084    0.424  0.075    0.033 
              N=636    [0.055]      [0.049]     
Very Competitive College  0.755  -0.150    0.545  0.297**    0.010 
              N=151    [0.107]      [0.139]     
Sample Size  1,070      795       
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. 
Columns 2 and 4 are estimates from equation (3) in the paper, with a full set of indicator variables for lottery 
status and low or high quality neighborhood school. Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and 
are clustered at the lottery level. Column 5 contains the p-value for an F-test that columns (2) and (4) are 
equal.  Competitive colleges are defined by the Barron's rankings - see the text of the paper for details. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 9 - COMPARISON OF SCHOOL VALUE-ADDED TO THE IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY 
    Measured School Quality Difference (Sj - Sn) 
 
  Unadjusted    8th 
Grade Xs    All 
Covariates    Pr(choice) 
Main Outcomes  (1)  (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
9th Grade English Score  -0.017  0.035    0.052    0.056    -0.104 
  [0.044]  [0.030]    [0.033]    [0.039]    [0.154] 
              Interaction Term    0.083    0.482    0.549    0.240 
    [0.077]    [0.354]    [0.439]    [0.214] 
                 
F(main effect = 0, interaction = 1)    0.000    0.002    0.001     
                 
9th Grade Math Score  -0.025  0.003    0.023    0.028    -0.470** 
  [0.051]  [0.052]    [0.065]    [0.068]    [0.188] 
              Interaction Term    0.296**    0.756    0.803    0.773** 
    [0.132]    [0.520]    [0.538]    [0.237] 
                 
F(main effect = 0, interaction = 1)    0.000    0.464    0.447     
                 
Graduated from CMS  0.036*  -0.002    0.015    0.023    -0.127 
  [0.020]  [0.026]    [0.026]    [0.024]    [0.103] 
              Interaction Term    0.522**    0.937*    0.979**    0.289 
    [0.209]    [0.463]    [0.428]    [0.187] 
                 
F(main effect = 0, interaction = 1)    0.023    0.808    0.431     
                 
Attended a 4 Year College  0.024  0.018    0.005    0.007    -0.072 
  [0.029]  [0.037]    [0.028]    [0.028]    [0.082] 
              Interaction Term    0.095    0.866*    0.974    0.172 
    [0.196]    [0.459]    [0.611]    [0.120] 
                 
F(main effect = 0, interaction = 1)    0.000    0.954    0.967     
                 
Very Competitive College  0.024**  0.020**    0.020**    0.020**    0.032 
  [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.009]    [0.009]    [0.029] 
              Interaction Term    0.068    0.301    0.320    -0.019 
    [0.077]    [0.344]    [0.409]    [0.046] 
                 
F(main effect = 0, interaction = 1)    0.000    0.001    0.003     
                 
Sample Size  1865               
Notes: Column 1 is the δ coefficient from equation (2) for each of the five main outcomes in the paper. Columns (2) 
through (4) estimate equation (4), where winning the lottery is interacted with the estimated difference in quality between 
the school that applicants attend if they win the lottery and the school they attend or would have attended had they lost. 
Column 5 interacts winning the lottery with the probability that students in each neighborhood school zone apply to 
another school. "Very Competitive" College is defined by the Barron's rankings - see the text of the paper for a list of NC 
colleges that apply. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE A1 - IMPACT OF WINNING THE LOTTERY ON PRE-LOTTERY COVARIATES 
  High Quality Neighborhood 
School    Low Quality Neighborhood 
School 
  (1)    (2) 
Median HH Income  -1319    -149 
  [2,136]    [902] 
Male  0.013    0.012 
  [0.046]    [0.025] 
Black  0.064*    0.033 
  [0.037]    [0.026] 
Latino  -0.014    -0.015 
  [0.015]    [0.016] 
FRPL  0.022    0.014 
  [0.029]    [0.036] 
Special Education  0.018    -0.024 
  [0.030]    [0.025] 
8th Grade Math  -0.067    0.069 
  [0.088]    [0.052] 
8th Grade Reading  -0.113    0.030 
  [0.076]    [0.045] 
Distance to Home  0.23    0.10 
  [0.26]    [0.20] 
Distance to Choice  1.07**    -0.51 
  [0.41]    [0.41] 
       
Sample Size  1865     
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are estimates from a form of equation (8) in the paper, with a full set of indicator 
variables for lottery status and low or high quality neighborhood school. Standard errors are below each 
estimate in brackets and are clustered at the lottery level.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE A2 - MAIN RESULTS, ALTERNATE SCHOOL QUALITY DEFINITION 
  HQ Neighborhood 
School    LQ Neighborhood 
School    F(equal) 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
  Bottom 4 Schools on Revealed Preference     
9th Grade Math (impute 8th)  -0.387  -0.074    -0.712  0.070*    0.008 
    [0.054]      [0.039]     
Graduated from CMS High School  0.639  0.004    0.547  0.076**    0.143 
    [0.025]      [0.038]     
Attended a 4 Year College  0.432  0.008    0.277  0.043    0.288 
    [0.032]      [0.034]     
Very Competitive  0.126  0.031*    0.054  0.016    0.338 
    [0.016]      [0.011]     
Most Competitive  0.034  0.004    0.009  0.012    0.539 
    [0.011]      [0.007]     
Earned a Degree               
Any 2 year college  0.029  0.013    0.021  0.007    0.735 
    [0.018]      [0.012]     
Any 4 year college  0.233  -0.017    0.099  0.033*    0.129 
    [0.023]      [0.019]     
Very Competitive  0.094  0.003    0.026  0.027***    0.123 
    [0.011]      [0.009]     
Most Competitive  0.029  -0.008    0.007  0.013*    0.067 
    [0.009]      [0.007]     
Sample Size  1006      859       
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 are mean values of the outcome in each row for students who lost the lottery. 
Columns 2 and 4 are estimates from equation (3) in the paper, with a full set of indicator variables for lottery 
status and low or high quality neighborhood school. Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and 
are clustered at the lottery level. Column 5 contains the p-value for an F-test that columns (2) and (4) are 
equal.  Competitive colleges are defined by the Barron's rankings - see the text of the paper for details. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 